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For a long time, the study of mind has been an exclusive 
privilege of Philosophy. Epistemic dispositions, the relation 
between mind, body and world, the nature of language and 
intentionality, even cognitive functions and emotional states 
have all been studied and discussed by the vast majority of 
philosophers. Nowadays, however, a purely philosophical 
perspective risks being quite limiting in the investigation of 
some types of these issues. In the last century, the 
neuroscientific revolution has changed the rules of the game, 
introducing new methodological and epistemological tools that 
allow the study of the mind by means of the brain. In this regard, 
it seems impossible to proceed towards any new theory of mind 
without discussing philosophical theses as well as relating them 
with empirical findings of Neuroscience and Cognitive sciences 
in general. 
For this reason, Georg Northoff’s “Neurophilosophy” could 
represent an optimal approach to explaining the relationship 
between mind and brain with both logical coherence and 
empirical plausibility. In Minding the Brain: A Guide to 
Philosophy and Neuroscience, Northoff exposes what he calls a 
“neurophilosophical approach” (p.x), by means of which he 
could analyse a wide range of issues, such as the mind-brain 
problem, the nature of consciousness, and the empirical structure 
of the self. This interdisciplinary approach needs a pluralist 
epistemological basis, grounded accurately between empirical 
and theoretical domains; therefore, a juxtaposition of new 
neuroscientific findings and logical theses is not sufficient to 
justify, ideologically, any classic theories about the mind. At the 
same time, Philosophy cannot passively approve data without 
challenging their empirical consistency and the scientific 
conditions of possibility.  
The book’s title itself suggests the author’s intention to connect 
different epistemological and ontological domains. The motto 
“minding the brain” highlights the aim to “recall to mind the 
brain”, but not in a memory-related sense. Indeed, Northoff 
expressively affirms his purpose to link the Philosophy of mind 
Universa. Recensioni di filosofia - Volume 6, n. 2 (2017) 
 
 
66  
with Neuroscience, but not in a reductive way (as some other 
neurophilosophical approaches do). In this regard, the author 
stands in the way of the reductive Neurophilosophy (p.4-6)e.g. 
Patricia Churchland’s account in Neurophilosophy: Toward a 
Unified Science of the Mind-Brain, which aims to incorporate 
Philosophy into the general and variegate range of the so-called 
Cognitive Sciences, and consequently to raise Neuroscience to 
the main research about the binomial mind-brain. Nevertheless, 
it is quite inappropriate to place the author’s perspective as a 
polar opposite of reductivism; in fact, non-reductivism does not 
entail an anti-naturalist view, according to which the Philosophy 
of mind should have complete autonomy from Neuroscience. 
Rather, Northoff tries to stand in the middle, putting forward a 
Neurophilosophy that is “[…] non-reductive primarily in the 
methodological (rather than metaphysical) sense” (p.1). Thus, 
the meaning of the title does not imply an exclusivist return to 
the mind nor does it involve its elimination in favour of the 
brain; and the same applies to the relationship between 
Philosophy and Neuroscience. The author affirms that Kant 
himself inspired his approach and he actually compares the 
transcendental method with a neural activity investigation, 
considering the neural correlate of consciousness a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for the mental phenomena (p.6). 
Perhaps, this kind of research seems more similar to a posteriori 
research about the a priori structures of knowledge, typically 
referred to in the transcendental approach of one of the founders 
of Psychologism: Jacob Fries. Yet, in the Kantian 
transcendentalism both the content of the research and the 
research process itself are a priori. To be sure, the comparison 
works nonetheless in a metaphorical sense. 
In order to explain his theoretical manifesto, the author 
distinguishes two main perspectives: the “mind-based” and the 
“brain-based” points of view (p.10). The former entails the 
assimilation of mental concepts into neuronal structure, through 
the question: “How is the mind and its mental features related to 
the brain?” (p.214). Surprisingly, according to the author, this 
methodologic strategy is ascribable to several trends such as 
mentalism, functionalism, physicalism, and so forth, regardless 
of the ontological commitment they endorse. For instance, 
ontologically speaking, reductive Neurophilosophy is based on 
strong physicalism, but it poses its epistemic starting point into 
the mind as a negative template, in order to substitute any 
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mental element to a brain equivalent (p.184). On the contrary, 
non-reductive Neurophilosophy involves a brain-based 
approach, moving from the essential question: “How are the 
brain and its neural features related to the mind?” The reversal 
of the question produces some new perspectives about the 
“mind/brain” relationship, and there is no need to find a neural 
correlate for any single mental property. It is rather, possible to 
avoid this epistemological bottleneck by integrating the brain 
within a philosophical context, as well as by finding new 
interdisciplinary approaches, while dismissing the assumption of 
any kind of supernatural feature (p.15). Thus, it seems that the 
author’s intention is to account for a study of the brain as such, 
not as an empirical substitute of the mind; any possible relation 
with the concept of mind will come after testing the approach, 
not as an a priori metaphysical assumption. 
A key issue of the book is Northoff’s epistemological 
justification of his theses. The author acknowledges the 
structural differences between scientific and philosophical 
domains. But, in spite of their reciprocal autonomies as to their 
methodology and field of research, he identifies  following 
Quine  the possibility of a connection in the breakdown of the 
resolute separation between analytic and synthetic sentences, 
and between a priori and a posteriori knowledge (p.48-51). 
Generally speaking, different domains of research do not lead to 
mutual epistemological exclusions; on the contrary, Philosophy 
and Science could be considered as “different degrees of 
abstraction on the same underlying continuum” (p.52). These 
Quinean claims lead the author to discuss the naturalistic ground 
of his Neurophilosophy. Hence, he distinguishes “replacement 
or incorporation naturalism” from “cooperative naturalism” 
(p.62-64); the former is typical of a reductive and monopolar 
methodology, while the latter allows for the development of 
different (philosophical and scientific) methods, towards a 
reciprocal complementarity. In this sense, Northoff’s 
methodology seems to rely on Quine’s “reciprocal containment” 
of philosophical epistemology and natural sciences, as it is 
defined in Epistemology Naturalized. 
Once this account of complementarity is extended to the 
relationship between philosophy and science, the author can 
provide a concrete neurophilosophical frame, which he calls 
“concept-fact iterativity” (p.117-121). On these epistemological 
premises, the non-reductive Neurophilosophy must demonstrate 
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the consistency and coherence of its method, established on the 
borderline between concepts and facts, as well as between 
metaphysics and the empirical field. For this reason, Northoff 
cannot accept any kind of unilateral method of adaptation, 
merely from facts to concepts (Churchland) or from concepts to 
facts (Searle) (p.112-117). Instead, its account provides us with 
a transdisciplinary and iterative linkage between theoretical and 
experimental domains. This method consists of philosophical 
and neuroscientific passages in a flowchart marked by feedbacks 
from the empirical, correction loops and interactions with the 
conceptual background (see figure p.119).  
After having exposed its theoretical claims about the relation 
between mind and brain, and having justified an original 
epistemology for its Neurophilosophy (part I), the rest of the 
book is nestled in this framework and all the issues are discussed 
from a non-reductive point of view. 
In the second part, Northoff examines a great number of 
approaches on monism and dualism, with regard to the mind-
brain problem. He translates the classic dichotomy 
monism/dualism into the division between mental, physical, 
non-mental, non-physical, and brain-based approaches. This 
kind of analysis is clear and willingly synthetic, due to the 
author’s intention not to explain all the issues of the topic, but 
rather to show these various positions in light of his 
epistemological perspective. In particular, as mentioned above, 
he privileges a brain-based approach, referring to various 
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authors that consider the brain under different domains, such as 
McGinn, Nagel, Schopenhauer, and Merleau-Ponty. 
Interestingly enough, according to Northoff, Schopenhauer can 
be considered a neurophilosopher ante-litteram, because of his 
distinction between the brain as the “subject of cognition” and 
the brain as the “object of cognition” (p.231). 
In the third part of the book, Northoff exposes and analyses 
some important issues about the philosophy of psychology and 
neuroscience  e.g. the variety of levels of explanation from 
subpersonal to personal stages, the nature of explanation in 
neuroscience, and holistic versus localizationist approaches. In 
particular, I would mention his position about the value of folk 
psychology and its irreducibility to neuroscientific explanation, 
however without falling into an ontological reification of mental 
states (p.274-275). 
Parts IV and V are dedicated to consciousness and self. One of 
the main problems dealt with here is the “hard problem” of 
consciousness  i.e. “Why is there consciousness at all rather 
than non-consciousness? And how is consciousness possible?” 
From a philosophical point of view, besides analysing the 
phenomenal and epistemological features of consciousness, he 
tries to approach it from a non-reductive  but still non-dualist  
perspective. At the same time, from a neuroscientific point of 
view, he discusses some neural theories of consciousness, in 
order to identify their potentialities and limits; in addition, he 
distinguishes between neural “correlates”, “predispositions”, and 
“prerequisites” of consciousness, while neuroscientists 
ordinarily consider only the first kind of concept in their studies. 
Moreover, the author discusses how our self is intertwined with 
the brain, also through the analysis of psychiatric disorders and 
the focus on our constitutive capability to relate with others, 
which points at the importance of intersubjectivity due to the 
features of mirror neurons (p.522-532). 
To sum up, Minding the Brain is a very rich and variegate haven 
of arguments, topics, and fields of research, all unified under the 
umbrella of the interdisciplinary and constantly growing 
perspective of non-reductive Neurophilosophy. The clarity in its 
contents makes the book suitable for philosophers who want to 
become acquainted with contemporary neuroscientific progress, 
and for neuroscientists who want to deepen their understanding 
of some essential philosophical issues about mind and 
consciousness. Moreover, its pedagogic structure  e.g. its take-
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home messages, summaries, revision notes and suggested 
readings  makes it a good choice for university courses. 
Maybe, the addition of footnotes with accurate citations or 
references to all the various philosophical arguments, authors, 
and empirical research would make reading this book more 
available. 
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